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## TROOP MOVEMENTS ON THE AMERICAN RAILROADS DURING THE GREAT WAR

THE Spanish-American War demonstrated the necessity for reform in the War Department's methods of dealing with the important problem of military transportation. During that emergency there seems to have been very little real co-operation between the railroads of the country and the government. It was not until July 18, 1898, more than three months after war was declared, that the Transportation Division of the Quartermaster's Department was created and charged with the supervision and control of all rail and water transportation.<sup>1</sup>

A few years after the Spanish-American War, the Quartermaster General's Office and the transportation companies began to co-ordinate their efforts and to work together more cordially and more effectively than in 1898. In 1905, and again in 1912, arrangements were made regarding the handling of troops and supplies. Throughout 1914 and 1915 it seemed probable that the United States would find it necessary to intervene in Mexico, and during the latter year, in order to avoid the possibility of a recurrence of the conditions of 1898, the officer in charge of the Transportation Division of the Quartermaster General's Office appeared before several transportation associations and outlined the plan of mutual co-operation which was practically the one later put into effect. On October 26, 1915, upon the recommendation of the Quartermaster General's Office, the Secretary of War suggested that the American Railway Association establish a "committee on military transportation to whom the department could look for any information that might be desired as to the railroads of the United States and with a further view to co-ordination between the railroads and the War Department in the transportation of troops and supplies of the United States."<sup>2</sup> Shortly afterwards a "Special Committee on Co-operation with the Military Authorities" was appointed by the American Railway Association, and Fairfax Harrison, president of the Southern Railway, was named chairman of the committee. During the winter of 1915-1916 the committee was in frequent session with the officers

<sup>1</sup> *General Orders*, no. 122, War Dept., Aug. 18, 1898.

<sup>2</sup> *Report of the Quartermaster General*, 1916.

of the Transportation Division of the Quartermaster General's Office and a general plan of co-operation was agreed upon.<sup>3</sup>

The trouble with Mexico became more and more acute and on June 18, 1916, the Secretary of War, through the governors of the various states, called into the federal service the greater part of the organized militia and of the National Guard.<sup>4</sup> The special committee of the American Railway Association met at once in the office of the Quartermaster General, in Washington, with Lieutenant-Colonel Chauncey B. Baker, who represented the Quartermaster General, and the plans formulated during the previous winter were immediately placed in effect. Competent railway officials were placed at the headquarters of the four territorial departments of the army, at each mobilization camp of the National Guard, and in the office of the Quartermaster General in Washington. These officials, or general agents, as they came to be called, acted as advisers to the officers of the Quartermaster Corps on all questions affecting the railroads. Upon notification that an organization was about to leave camp for the border, the camp quartermaster consulted with the general agent at the camp, telling him the strength of the organization, the approximate date of departure, the number and kind of cars required, etc. The general agent then set about assembling all railroad equipment other than tourist sleeping-cars, in time for the movement. The assignment of tourist cars for troop movements was handled from Washington by the Transportation Division of the Quartermaster General's Office, assisted by a representative of the Pullman Company at the capital. By the adoption of these methods the War Department and railroads alike hoped to prevent a repetition during the operations in Mexico of the congestion which occurred during the war with Spain. That they succeeded is generally agreed. Both the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War commended the special committee for its splendid co-operation with the government, and the President warmly congratulated the American Railway Association on its patriotic efforts.<sup>5</sup>

From the beginning of the Great War in 1914 many persons in the United States realized that this nation might at any moment become involved in the struggle. Common prudence dictated the necessity of preparation. It was this motive which led to the crea-

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> Telegram, Secretary of War to state governors, June 18, 1916.

<sup>5</sup> *Reports of the Q. M. G., 1916, 1917; Report of the Secretary of War, 1916; Report of the Chief of Staff, 1916.*

tion of the Council of National Defense, which was authorized by the Army Appropriation Act of August 29, 1916. An Advisory Commission of the Council, consisting of seven members, was formed, and Daniel Willard, president of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and chairman of the Advisory Commission, was named chairman of a Committee on Transportation and Communication. Its function was the organization of the transportation facilities of the country for the rapid transportation of the large bodies of troops and the enormous quantities of supplies which would be needed if the United States should enter the war.<sup>6</sup>

February 16, 1917, at the request of Mr. Willard, the executive committee of the American Railway Association met in New York City and decided to enlarge the Special Committee on Co-operation with the Military Authorities and to designate it as a Special Committee on National Defense. Though not officially a part of the Council of National Defense nor of its Advisory Commission, it was closely associated with the latter and was sometimes regarded as a subcommittee of the Advisory Commission. Its function was the organization of the railroads for mutual co-operation and co-ordination in case of emergency. Fairfax Harrison, who had been chairman of the Special Committee on Co-operation with the Military Authorities in 1916, was named chairman of the new committee. Four district committees, eastern, central, southern, and western, were established, corresponding to the four military departments of the United States, with whose commanding generals they were to co-operate in connection with the work of the Council of National Defense. The chairmen of these district committees, with Mr. Harrison as general chairman, constituted a special executive committee.

The new Special Committee on National Defense met in Washington March 1, 1917, in conference with the Secretary of War and representatives of the General Staff and the Quartermaster General's Office. At this meeting Colonel Baker, representing the Quartermaster General, presented a definite plan for co-operation between the government and the railways. The railway committee on March 2 decided that the district committees should get in touch with the military commanders of their respective departments as soon as possible. It was also decided that in case of any large troop movements the transportation should be handled under the same plan as in 1916. The central office of the executive committee in Washington

<sup>6</sup> *First Annual Report of the Council of National Defense* (Washington, 1917).

was put under the charge of George Hodges, a man of wide railroad experience, who had been in immediate charge of the transportation of troops in 1916. By the first of April the organization was practically complete. The railroads were the first great industry of the United States to perfect an organization to co-operate with the military authorities and to offer its services to the Secretary of War.<sup>7</sup>

The emergency for which the railroads had been preparing came on April 6, 1917, when the United States declared that a state of war existed with the imperial German government. The following day the Council of National Defense directed the chairman of the Committee on Transportation and Communication to call upon the railroads to organize for the utmost despatch in the movement of freight.<sup>8</sup> In answer to the chairman's summons, nearly fifty railway presidents, representing the transportation interests of the entire nation, assembled in Washington April 11, 1917, and resolved to "co-ordinate their operations in a continental railway system, merging . . . all their merely individual and competitive activities in the effort to produce a maximum of national transportation efficiency".<sup>9</sup> To accomplish this object the railway executives empowered the American Railway Association's Special Committee on National Defense to formulate and direct the carrying-out of a policy of operation for all the railroads. The four district sub-committees composing the Special Committee were increased to six to agree with the territorial departments of the army, which had on April 2 been likewise increased.<sup>10</sup> Fairfax Harrison remained general chairman of the committee.

An executive committee of five members was chosen from the general committee and Mr. Harrison was appointed chairman with authority to select the four other members. Daniel Willard, representing the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense, and Edgar E. Clark, of the Interstate Commerce Commission, were *ex officio* members. This committee, which came to be known as the Railroads' War Board, directed the operation of virtually all the railroads of the United States; no less than 693 railroads, controlling over 260,000 miles of track and employing almost 1,750,000 persons, agreed to carry out its orders. During the summer and autumn of 1917 the War Board attempted to secure higher efficiency and better utilization of the available transportation facil-

<sup>7</sup> *Rept. of the Q. M. G.*, 1917.

<sup>8</sup> *First Ann. Rept. of Council for Natl. Defense* (Washington, 1917).

<sup>9</sup> Special Committee on National Defense, Am. Ry. Assn. *Bulletin*, no. 9, Apr. 16, 1917.

<sup>10</sup> *General Orders*, no. 38, War Dept., Apr. 2, 1917.

ties by co-ordinating their efforts and sinking, so far as the existing laws permitted, their competitive individual interests.<sup>11</sup>

The creation of the Railroads' War Board in the spring of 1917 was "probably the most important and revolutionary step" taken in the history of American railways to that time. By placing the operation of all their facilities under the direction of a single committee of five for the period of the war, it constituted them, with certain limitations, a single continental system. "At the same time, it placed the services of this great railway system unreservedly at the disposal of the government. . . . Perhaps the most significant feature of the matter was that this act on the part of the railways was purely voluntary. No law required it. Another of its very significant features was that the step was taken without any prospect of especial consideration or compensation having been held out by the government".<sup>12</sup> This was in decided contrast with the situation in England, where the government at the very beginning of the war assumed control of the railroads by law. While the English railroads transported troops and munitions free of charge, their earnings were guaranteed by the government.

Subordinate to the Special Committee on National Defense and acting under the direction of its executive committee were several subcommittees. The more important of these were the Commission on Car Service and the subcommittees on Military Transportation Accounting, on Military Passenger Tariffs, and on Military Freight Tariffs. This organization, thus established with permanent headquarters at Washington, with its staff of experts and employees, with subcommittees both in Washington and in many cities throughout the country, was maintained wholly at the expense of the railroads.<sup>13</sup>

The organization described above was designed to control the operation of the entire continental system of railways, and it was as much concerned with the private shipper and traveller as with the government. To handle the problem of troop transportation there was built up at Washington in the office of Fairfax Harrison,

<sup>11</sup> Edgar E. Clark, Interstate Commerce Commission, *Government Control and Operation of Railroads, Hearing before the Committee on Interstate Commerce*, U. S. Senate, 65 Cong., 2 sess., pursuant to S. Res. 171 (Washington, 1918), p. 120.

<sup>12</sup> R. H. Aishton, president of the Chicago and N. W. R. R. and chairman of Central Department Subcommittee of the Railroads' War Board, address, Sept. 14, 1917, before the St. Louis Railway Club, quoted in *Railway Age Gazette*, Sept. 28, 1917, pp. 547 ff.

<sup>13</sup> Special Committee on National Defense, *Bulletin*, no. 9, Apr. 16, 1917.

general chairman of the Railroads' War Board, a small but very efficient organization known as the Troop Movement Force, which was placed under the immediate direction of George Hodges, assistant to the general chairman. Mr. Hodges had been in charge of the troop transportation for the railroads in 1916, and the system used then was expanded and adapted to the greater emergency. The functions of the central bureau of the Troop Movement Force were briefly these: to gather all necessary information regarding equipment needed and available; to arrange for the transfer of equipment from one road or section of the country to another; to expedite the return of empty cars; to keep informed as to threatened conditions of congestion, and to make provisions for avoiding it; and, generally, to assist in every way practicable in the smooth operation of troop trains.<sup>14</sup> In time, this central bureau in Washington came to be divided into three sections: a routing section, which arranged routes subject to the approval of the Quartermaster General; a transportation section, which controlled the arrangements for the actual movement of troops over the railroads involved, and kept in touch with all that concerned troop transportation by means of daily reports from the transportation general agents; and a Pullman section, which apportioned the available tourist cars to the various troop movements under authorization for their use from the Quartermaster General. Liaison between the central bureau and the War Department was maintained through an officer of the Quartermaster Corps and a railway representative. Representatives or general agents of the American Railway Association, designated by the Special Committee on National Defense, were stationed at each of the six departmental headquarters of the army, in the office of the governor or adjutant general of each state, at the headquarters of the Construction Quartermaster, and at each mobilization and concentration camp, cantonment, and port of embarkation. At each place were two general agents, one reporting to the Troop Movement Force and the other to the Military Transportation Accounting Subcommittee. The latter assisted the departmental and camp quartermasters in making out transportation requests, bills of lading, and the like. The former was assigned as a transportation expert, and it was his duty to keep in touch with the quartermaster at his post, to see that all trains and cars were provided when needed, that loading was properly done, and in general to translate

<sup>14</sup> *Id., Bulletin*, no. 8, Mar. 27, 1917; also *Special Regulations*, no. 63, War Dept., Apr. 20, 1917.

into terms of action the transportation necessities of the army.<sup>15</sup> The railroad companies throughout the country were each directed by the central bureau to designate a "troop reporting official", who should be responsible for the carrying out by his company of orders from Washington or from the general agents. These "troop reporting officials" were entrusted with the cipher code used by the Troop Movement Force in reporting the movements of troop-trains.<sup>16</sup>

December 28, 1917, the government assumed control of the railroads and on the thirty-first the members of the Railroads' War Board resigned. Their subcommittees were either taken over by the United States Railroad Administration, or dissolved, and their functions were assigned to other parts of that organization.<sup>17</sup> The Troop Movement Force, however, did not at once become a part of the new administration, and for some months its members continued their work as before and were still spoken of as American Railway Association representatives. The government's assumption of control over the railroads occasioned no alteration in the functioning of their organization. May 24, 1918, the Troop Movement Force became the Troop Movement Section of the Division of Transportation of the United States Railroad Administration. George Hodges, who had been in charge of the work since its initiation, was appointed manager, and the functions of the section were defined as the arrangement for, and supervision of, the details of the movement of troops, with their impedimenta, routing, provision of equipment, etc.<sup>18</sup>

The authority to order the movement of troops was vested in the Secretary of War, who exercised his power through the General Staff, the co-ordinating agency of the War Department. Orders, once approved by the Chief of Staff, were issued by the Adjutant General of the army. During 1917 and the early part of 1918 all matters relating to troop movements were handled by the Operations Committee of the War College Division of the General Staff. In the reorganization of the General Staff, February 9, 1918, this committee was consolidated with the Equipment Committee of the same division under the name of Operations Division. It was charged with the cognizance and control of army operations and

<sup>15</sup> George Hodges, Memorandum on Troop Movement Force, Dec. 31, 1917.

<sup>16</sup> Interview with H. Y. Turner, Troop Movement Section, Mar. 10, 1919.

<sup>17</sup> For a full account of the work of the Railroads' War Board and of the U. S. R. R. Administration one must seek elsewhere. Here we are concerned only with the Troop Movement Section.

<sup>18</sup> *Circular*, no. 3, U. S. R. R. Adminis., Div. of Trans., May 24, 1918.

was placed under an officer designated as the Director of Operations, who was an assistant to the Chief of Staff. Among the duties of the division were the movement and distribution of troops and the determination of all "overseas priority". Brigadier-General Henry Jersey was appointed Director of Operations, and the great troop movement of 1918 was carried out under his supervision.

After orders for the movement of troops and their equipment had been issued, the duty of providing the means of transportation devolved upon the Quartermaster Corps.<sup>19</sup> The Transportation Division of the Quartermaster General's Office handled all matters pertaining to transportation, whether on land or sea, and through its Land Transportation Branch it supervised all movements of troops and quartermaster supplies by land.<sup>20</sup> During the early months of the war the Land Transportation Branch, when advised of a projected troop movement, at once notified the department and camp quartermasters concerned as to the route to be used; it also informed the Troop Movement Force of the American Railway Association. The latter organization then issued instructions regarding the date of the movement, the assembling of railway equipment, etc., to its department and camp general agents directly concerned, who co-operated with the local quartermasters in arranging the details of the movement. The routing and movement of parties of fifty or less might be ordered by any officer in charge at the point of origin; the movement of larger parties within a department was controlled by the department quartermaster, while all inter-department movements of more than fifty men were authorized at first through the Quartermaster General's Office at Washington, and, after the organization of the Inland Traffic Service in January, 1918, by the Troop Movement Section of that agency. After October 10, 1917, routings were issued by the Troop Movement Force of the railroads, subject to the approval of the Quartermaster General.<sup>21</sup> August 4, 1917, the Embarkation Service was created in the office of the Chief of Staff and charged with the co-ordination of all shipments of munitions and supplies of every kind and of all troop movements whose ultimate destination was Europe.<sup>22</sup> Department and division commanders were ordered not to send any organiza-

<sup>19</sup> *Army Regulations*, 1913, par. 1000; *Field Service Regulations*, 1914, par. 388.

<sup>20</sup> *Rules and Regulations of the Quartermaster General* (1915), pp. 209 ff. This paper does not concern itself with the problem of the transportation of supplies, but only with the story of troop movements.

<sup>21</sup> *Bulletin*, no. 37, Oct. 10, 1917, of executive committee of Special Committee on National Defense, Am. Railway Assn.

<sup>22</sup> *General Orders*, no. 102, War Dept., Aug. 4, 1917.

tion to a port of embarkation until the details connected with the movement had been arranged directly with the commanding general of the port or with his subordinates.<sup>23</sup>

The very serious congestion on the railroads in the autumn of 1917 led to the taking over of the railroads by the government on December 28, as noted above. On the same day the Storage and Traffic Division of the General Staff was created and placed under Major-General George W. Goethals. January 10, 1918, in an effort to centralize and co-ordinate all army transportation, General Goethals appointed Mr. H. M. Adams, an experienced railroad man, director of inland transportation,<sup>24</sup> and instructed him to organize a Division of Inland Transportation (called after May 1, 1918, the Inland Traffic Service), which should have jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to the routing and transportation, inland, by whatever means of transport, of all troops and property.<sup>25</sup> The new organization had to do primarily with the transportation of supplies, and its activities in connection therewith cannot be discussed here. In this article we are concerned only with its relation to the movement of troops and their "unit equipment". Generally speaking it assumed the place formerly held by the Land Transportation Branch of the Quartermaster General's Office. The officer who had been in charge of that branch since December 1, 1917, became assistant to Mr. Adams on January 18, 1918, and exercised direct supervision over the handling of troops.<sup>26</sup> A Troop Movement Section was established in the Division of Inland Transportation, and after February 26 it was placed under an officer who had formerly been located in the office of the Quartermaster General as civilian representative of the American Railway Association. The principal function of the Troop Movement Section was to act as a channel of communication between the Operations Division of the General Staff, the Embarkation Service, and the Troop Movement Section of the railroads. After movements had been ordered by the Operations Division through the Adjutant General, the department or camp quartermasters requested the Troop Movement Section of the Inland Traffic Service to supply routings, dates of movements, equipment, etc.; this information it secured from the railroad organization, and if it approved the routings proposed it informed the

<sup>23</sup> Adjutant General to commanding generals of all departments and divisions, Dec. 29, 1917.

<sup>24</sup> Office Order (not numbered), Director of Traffic, Jan. 10, 1918.

<sup>25</sup> *Id.*, no. 151, Director of Traffic, Jan. 15, 1918.

<sup>26</sup> Memorandum of Lt.-Col. H. S. Ray, for executive officer, Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division, Dec. 5, 1918.

military authorities interested as to the routes to be followed, the availability of Pullman and coach equipment, and the scheduled dates for the movements. The Troop Movement Section of the railroads issued the same instructions to the railroads interested and to their department general agents, who informed the camp general agents.<sup>27</sup> The responsibility for carrying out instructions rested entirely upon the railroads and the local military authorities were not permitted to change a plan once decided upon nor to interfere with the operation of a train.

During 1918, when an ever increasing number of troops was being shipped overseas, a monthly conference was held at which the Operations Division, the Embarkation Service, the Troop Movement Section of the Inland Traffic Service, and the Troop Movement Section of the railroads were all represented. At this conference a tentative schedule for the next month was arranged. The Operations Division stated what organization it desired to move overseas; the Embarkation Service stated the probable amount of tonnage available; and the railroad officials indicated the amount of equipment they had on hand and to what extent they would be able to co-operate. The date at which an organization was desired at the port of embarkation or at the embarkation camp was fixed by the commanding general of the port. The Land Transportation Branch of the Quartermaster General's Office continued to handle all transportation matters not determined by the Inland Traffic Service, but its work was taken over more and more by the latter and on June 15, 1918, it was abolished.<sup>28</sup>

The movement of troops with their impedimenta, of selective service men, and recruits may be divided into five phases: first, the movement of the Regular Army from the border to various camps; second, the movement of the National Guard to its training camps; third, the movement of the men of the National Army from their homes to the cantonments; fourth, intercamp movements to meet the needs of the service; and lastly, the movement of organizations from the camps to ports of embarkation.<sup>29</sup> This arrangement is not only a convenient one, but it is in the large sense strictly chronological.

The active military forces of the United States, at the outbreak of war, numbered 200,157.<sup>30</sup> These men were distributed at vari-

<sup>27</sup> Capt. J. D. Cutter to the same, Dec. 12, 1918.

<sup>28</sup> Office Order, no. 464, office of Q. M. G., June 15, 1918.

<sup>29</sup> Memorandum of George Hodges, Dec. 31, 1917.

<sup>30</sup> Mobilization Table, no. 3, Mobilization Section, Historical Branch, War Plans Division of the General Staff.

ous army posts throughout the country, in outlying possessions of the nation, and in China; approximately 50,000 were on or near the Mexican border.<sup>31</sup> In May it was decided to concentrate the border troops at a comparatively small number of camps, principally in the North and East, where the various regiments might be utilized as nuclei for larger organizations, recruits from depots be added, and training for overseas service begun. The first movements recorded by the Troop Movement Section of the railroads began on May 18, 1917, when various regiments on the Mexican border began to entrain for other points. By June 4 this movement, involving the transportation of approximately 25,531 officers and men, was completed. Owing to the relatively small number of men involved and their experience in travel the task of moving them was performed with great ease by the railroads. The longest journey during this period was that of the 1913 men of the 23d U. S. Infantry, who travelled 2624 miles from El Paso, Texas, to Syracuse, New York; the shortest was that of the 1306 men of the 13th Cavalry, from Fort Bliss, Texas, to Fort Riley, Kansas, a distance of 943 miles. These organizations took with them all their baggage, organization property, and animals. Where conditions warranted it, the troop property and animals were loaded on a special train with only a few soldiers; in other cases the troop-train was composed not only of tourist sleepers for the men and baggage- and box-cars for their impedimenta, but also of flat-cars for vehicles and stock-cars for the animals.

It was at this time that the troops for the first convoy were concentrated at Hoboken for transportation to France. Not one of the eight organizations comprising this first combatant force to cross the Atlantic travelled less than 2000 miles to the port of embarkation. One regiment of infantry travelled 2679 miles from Douglas, Arizona; the others came from various points in Texas. The 11,234 men concerned travelled an average distance of 2392 miles to their destination. The first units to leave the border were the supply companies of the four infantry regiments, which entrained on May 31; the infantry regiments and the other units entrained June 2-3, and by June 10 the last train had arrived at Hoboken. The Troop Movement Force of the railroads made all the arrangements for this movement, which has been characterized as the longest long-distance movement of troops that had ever been made

<sup>31</sup> *Report of the Adjutant General of the Army* (1917), table opposite p. 19.

at one time in the United States to that date.<sup>32</sup> It was a record often surpassed during the next seventeen months.

July 3, 1917, the President issued a proclamation calling into the service of the United States the National Guard of thirty states. The same proclamation provided that on August 5 the entire National Guard of the nation should be drafted into the military service of the government.<sup>33</sup> At this time the National Guard consisted of sixteen tactical divisions. Orders were issued for their concentration, for organization and training, at as many camps, all of them located in the southern half of the country. The movement of the state troops to camp involved the transportation by rail of about 343,223 men, and extended over a period of eleven weeks, from August 4 to November 23. The entire movement was made by the railroads upon the schedule outlined by the War Department; at the suggestion of the Troop Movement Force it was twice suspended for brief periods during the movement of increments of the National Army to their cantonments.<sup>34</sup> The greater part of this movement of the National Guard was completed before the middle of October, 1917; in November the New England regiments still in camp in the North were ordered to Camp Greene, North Carolina. In general, when a unit of the National Guard moved from its home state to camp it carried with it all its organization property, vehicles, and animals. Heavy tentage in most cases was shipped direct from depots to the training camps and not carried by the separate units. Statistics are not at hand for the complete movement of the Guard, but up to October 11, 1917, there had been transported to camp 294,752 officers and men.<sup>35</sup> The average distance travelled was 770 miles; in the South, as a rule, the National Guard went but a short distance to camp, while the men from the Northern states often travelled great distances—the Montana National Guard, for example, journeyed 2645 miles to Camp Greene, North Carolina.

In August, 1917, the War Department authorized the formation of a seventeenth National Guard division, the Forty-second, from units selected from twenty-seven states. This division was concentrated at Camp Mills, Long Island, in the latter part of August, 1917. Those units possessing vehicles, engineer, signal corps, and other heavy equipment, transported it to Camp Mills and shipped

<sup>32</sup> F. E. Williamson, general agent, New York, to Maj. D. A. Watt, adjutant, port of embarkation, Hoboken, N. J., July 17, 1918.

<sup>33</sup> General Orders, no. 90, War Dept., July 12, 1917.

<sup>34</sup> Memorandum of George Hodges, Dec. 31, 1917.

<sup>35</sup> Records of the Troop Movement Section, U. S. R. R. Adminis.

their animals to Newport News. Other units of this division, being newly organized, had no animals, technical or other equipment beyond quartermaster supplies, to carry with them.<sup>36</sup>

The movement of the National Guard was still in progress when the first detachments of the new National Army left their homes for the cantonments on September 5, 1917. The process of mobilization, under the Selective Service Administration, may be divided into three stages: the requisition, the call, and the entrainment. During 1917 all requisitions and all calls were made for "the run of the draft", *i.e.*, for men, either white or colored, who were physically qualified for general military service. Practically all of these men were sent to one or another of the sixteen National Army cantonments provided for the purpose. But during 1918 new conditions arose and men with certain physical, occupational, or educational qualifications were requisitioned. Moreover the number of stations to which men could be sent was increased to include every post in the United States, Alaska, Hawaii, and Porto Rico, as well as hundreds of schools and colleges. After the calls to be issued under a particular requisition had been allocated to the states which were to contribute to the levy, induction telegrams were issued from Washington, calling on the respective states for the entrainment of their quotas. The railroads were then consulted, the camp commanders notified, and the proper supply bureaus informed. Upon receipt of a call, each state headquarters proceeded to allocate the call for that state among its local boards.

"The time set for entrainment was generally made by the local boards an occasion of formality and ceremony, and in most communities it took on the marks of a public festivity." There were public addresses, parades, and demonstrations at the railroad stations. It was this public celebration on the day of entrainment which had much to do with popularizing the draft; for "the general sentiment of military patriotism came thus to be associated in an open and emphatic manner with the processes of the draft".<sup>37</sup> Prior to July 31, 1918, drunkenness among drafted men en route to camp had occasionally led to disorders resulting in damage to railroad equipment and other property. On that date certain changes were made in the Selective Service Regulations which provided for the wearing of a brassard in lieu of a uniform by all draftees, thereby making it illegal to sell liquor to them; for the

<sup>36</sup> *Report of the Acting Chief of the Militia Bureau* (1918), pp. 8-10, 139.

<sup>37</sup> *Second Report of the Provost Marshal General to the Secretary of War* (Dec. 20, 1918), pp. 232 ff.

appointment of leaders for each contingent; and for the distribution of regulations governing drafted men en route to camp. These changes resulted in the practical elimination of all further trouble.<sup>38</sup>

The 4531 entraining points and (in 1918) the hundreds of stations to which the selectives were sent complicated the entrainment problem tremendously. Before a call could be issued the Railroad Administration required fourteen days' notice to enable it to compile and print the train schedules for the movement (which was usually distributed over a five-day period), and to make the necessary arrangements with the railroads. In 1917 the entrainment schedules were all compiled and published by the several passenger associations of the country, and a representative of the American Railway Association was placed in the office of the governor or adjutant general of each state to adjust any difficulties that might arise.<sup>39</sup> During 1918 the United States Railroad Administration supervised the preparation of the schedules and replaced the "A. R. A." man by a "military representative" of its Traffic Division. These schedules, which were most elaborate, were prepared for each call in every state. Each gave the number of the call, the dates set for the movement, the camp to which the men were to go, the county, county-seat, and entraining station, the number of men from each county, the route to be followed, the time of departure, and the arrangements made for providing meals.<sup>40</sup> Copies of each schedule were placed in the possession of the railroads concerned and of every one of the local boards at points of origin. As a result of this careful attention to detail, the mobilization proceeded so smoothly that few persons in the community at large realized the enormous task which was being performed.

The Provost Marshal General in his reports on the operation of the Selective Service System<sup>41</sup> expresses the utmost admiration of the work of the railroads throughout the war. "No more difficult transportation problem", he says, "could be conceived"; their work "was so satisfactorily performed that less than a dozen complaints were received during the whole year" of 1918. At times they were called upon to handle as many as 50,000 selected men in one day, and to transport within a single month over 400,000 men for the selective service system alone. Their performance on November

<sup>38</sup> Changes, no. 7, Selective Service Regulations, July 31, 1918.

<sup>39</sup> Memorandum of George Hodges, Dec. 31, 1917.

<sup>40</sup> "Specimen Entrainment Schedule", *Second Report of the Provost Marshal General*, pp. 325 ff.

<sup>41</sup> *Rept. of the Provost Marshal Gen.* (Dec. 20, 1917), p. 26; *id.*, *Second Report* (Dec. 20, 1918), pp. 239 ff.

11, 1918, was especially noteworthy. Calls had been issued and all arrangements completed for the entrainment of some 250,000 men during the five-day period beginning on that day. At 10.25 A.M. on Monday, November 11, the United States Railroad Administration was advised by telephone that the Secretary of War had cancelled these calls. "In 35 minutes they had notified all the railroads of the country; had stopped further entrainment; had reversed such contingents as were en route; and were restoring the men to the original points of entrainment. This achievement", continues the Provost Marshal General, "stands out as a marvel of efficiency and is but an indication of the co-operation which they constantly rendered."

The total number of men called under the selective service system was 2,801,358. According to the records of the Provost Marshal General's Office 2,755,476 of these men were transported to camp by railroads controlled by the United States Railroad Administration.<sup>42</sup> The average number of miles travelled by each man was 388; the entire mobilization therefore involved the equivalent of 1,069,124,688 miles of travel by one passenger. It is estimated that the movements required for the mobilization under the selective draft represented about one-fourth of the entire troop movement for the War Department.

By the middle of October, 1917, the greater part of the National Guard troops had reached their training camps in the South, and nearly 450,000 selected men of the first draft had been transported to the sixteen National Army cantonments. The movements of the Regular Army already described involved about 36,765 men. Beginning about the first of August, 1917, large intercamp movements of the Regular Army began, in the course of which organizations were ordered from their stations to more convenient camps and concentration points, and recruits were transported from various depots throughout the country to the camps. One small group of recruits, for example, was ordered from Vancouver Barracks to Waco, Texas, a distance of 4078 miles. In September and October training *cadres* of 961 men each were ordered transferred from the Regular Army to each of the sixteen National Army divisions.<sup>43</sup> During the autumn of 1917 some 50,000 men of the Regular Army were transferred from their stations in the North to more comfortable winter quarters in southern camps. As time went on the intercamp movements of the regulars increased in frequency and by

<sup>42</sup> *Second Rept. of the Provost Marshal Gen.*, pp. 240 ff.

<sup>43</sup> *Army War College Records*.

January 1, 1918, approximately 308,000 had been thus moved about the country. It was the general policy of the Operations Committee always to move troops from the West towards the ports of embarkation, but it was not always possible or practicable to do so.

About the middle of October, 1917, the Operations Committee began to transfer from each National Army cantonment sufficient drafted men to bring the corresponding National Guard division to full strength. In this connection an interesting situation developed in the South. In September it began to appear that if the three southern National Guard divisions—the 30th, 31st, and 39th—were to be brought to full strength by men drawn from Camps Jackson, Gordon, and Pike, the corresponding National Army cantonments, these latter camps would each be left with more colored than white troops, which was deemed highly undesirable. To concentrate all the white men from these three cantonments at one would leave the other two with no white men and all their negroes. The problem was finally solved by distributing the entire colored draft throughout the country in such a way that the ratio of whites to colored was everywhere preponderant; by filling up all the National Guard divisions with National Army men from the corresponding cantonments; by concentrating at Camp Jackson all the remaining white men in Camps Jackson, Gordon, and Pike, and forming of them an "All-Southern" National Army division (the 81st); and by forming at Camps Gordon and Pike two composite National Army divisions (the 82d and 87th) of men drawn from all the remaining National Army cantonments except Camp Lewis. To accomplish all this necessitated the transportation of between 105,000 and 110,000 more men than had been anticipated by the Operations Committee.<sup>44</sup> Beginning about December 15 many National Army troops were transferred to camps where Regular Army organizations were being recruited to full strength. In the last ten weeks of 1917 approximately 175,000 drafted men were moved from one camp to another.<sup>45</sup>

During 1918, as the army continued to grow in size, these inter-camp movements increased in volume. The practice of drawing on the drafted men to fill the National Guard and Regular Army divisions continued. In March the Operations Division began to draw on the depot brigades of the National Army for men for various special and technical services—for corps and army troops, for

<sup>44</sup> Memorandum of Capt. T. W. Hammond, General Staff, for Chief of Staff, Sept. 27, 1917, approved Oct. 4, 1917. *Army War College Records*.

<sup>45</sup> Records of Troop Movement Section, U. S. R. R. Adminis.

engineer regiments, field signal battalions, replacement organizations of various kinds, medical and veterinary units, the Quartermaster Corps and Ordnance Department, and for the United States Guards. Then men of the Medical Department, either as individuals or as organizations, were constantly moving to and from the medical training camps at Fort Riley, Fort Benjamin Harrison, and Camp Greenleaf; aero squadrons were leaving the aviation mobilization camp at Waco, Texas, for various flying fields, and during the summer and autumn of 1918 there was a steady stream of men to and from the National Army training detachments at various educational institutions throughout the country.<sup>46</sup> These intercamp movements involved about 42 per cent. of the total number of men transported by rail between January 1 and November 11, 1918.

No accurate statistics are available regarding the number of men who travelled on furlough during the war, but that extremely heavy demands were made upon the railroads by the furloughs granted at divisional camps for week-ends and holidays is obvious. At Thanksgiving and at Christmas, 1917, the number of men on leave was well above 100,000 in each case. As for the number of men regularly on leave, the general agent at Camp Meade, for example, estimated that about 11,500 men (about 30 per cent. of the total strength of the camp) were granted passes or furloughs during the week of February 10.<sup>47</sup> At Camp Sherman 30 per cent. of the 32,900 men in the camp were granted leaves of absence for Christmas, 1917, and it was the custom at that camp to grant week-end passes to 25 per cent. of the men in each unit.<sup>48</sup>

The movement of troops to the ports of embarkation for transportation overseas was necessarily conditioned by the War Department's plans regarding the composition and strength of the expeditionary forces, and a brief discussion of these plans is requisite for a complete understanding of the problem. At the outbreak of the war and for some time thereafter the War Department had no definite plan of operation.<sup>49</sup> At the request of both the British and French governments, however, it was decided to despatch as soon as possible base hospitals, ambulance units, railway engineers, and other auxiliary troops, who could be utilized at once by the allied

<sup>46</sup> *Bulletins*, nos. 1 ff., Misc. Div., Adjutant General's office.

<sup>47</sup> Report of general agent at Camp Meade to George Hodges, Feb. 18, 1918.

<sup>48</sup> Reports of general agent at Camp Sherman to George Hodges, Dec. 10, 1917, and Feb. 27, 1918.

<sup>49</sup> Memorandum from the office of the Chief of Staff for the Adjutant General, Apr. 6, 1917; comment by General Bliss, acting chief of staff, on memorandum from General Kuhn, May 28, 1917.

armies, and throughout the remainder of 1917 noncombatant troops formed a large proportion of those sent overseas. But in June, 1917, at the urgent insistence of the French, a small division of combatant troops was sent abroad, and by January 1, 1918, two complete divisions and parts of three others were in France. July 10, 1917, General Pershing transmitted to Washington his "general organization project" for the A. E. F., which called for a force of twenty combat divisions and ten replacement divisions, organized in five corps of six divisions each, with the proper proportions of corps, army, and service-of-the-rear troops.<sup>50</sup> This force, about 1,328,448 men, was to be in France "in time for an offensive in 1918".<sup>51</sup>

September 11, 1917, the War College Division in a memorandum for the Chief of Staff discussed the problem of raising sufficient men by September 1, 1918, to meet General Pershing's request. Instead of five corps, they planned to create seven corps of six divisions each with the necessary corps and army troops. The last corps would have but four divisions. Apparently their idea was that it would be possible to transport overseas four corps by April 1, 1918, the fifth corps by June 1, the sixth by July 1, and the seventh by August 1. Such an army would have numbered 1,675,000 men. On October 7, 1917, General Pershing sent to the War Department a "Priority of Shipments Schedule" in which was shown the order in which he desired the troops for the expeditionary forces despatched to France. The schedule did not apply to the special and technical troops furnished the French and British, nor did it cover the replacement drafts, aviation troops, and headquarters personnel. Its purpose was to provide a proper balance between all the various elements of the expeditionary forces. The existing situation, he said, was difficult because the service-of-the-rear troops in France did not bear an adequate proportion to the combat troops already there or expected in the near future. The schedule outlined a plan of shipment by "phases", of which there were six in all. Each phase, except the last, consisted of one corps of combat troops and the proper proportion of service-of-the-rear, corps, and army troops. He desired 50 per cent. of the service-of-the-rear troops to precede the combat troops in each phase and the remaining 50 per cent. to be shipped with the first half of the com-

<sup>50</sup> "A. E. F." project of Sept. 18, 1917.

<sup>51</sup> In his memorandum of July 10, 1917, Pershing places his total forces desired at 1,100,000; Sept. 18, 1917, he increases this figure to 1,328,448. In his Schedule of Priority of Shipments, Oct. 7, 1917, he names 1,247,399 as his grand total, excluding aviation and replacement troops.

bat troops of that phase. The six phases called for 275,200, 267,-490, 246,248, 231,743, 210,100, and 16,618 men respectively and the total number was 1,247,399. Without specifying any particular date, General Pershing indicated his desire to have the first four phases—about 1,020,000 men—in France in time for the 1918 offensive. This date was usually set at June 1, 1918.

Throughout the winter of 1917-1918 an effort was made by the Operations Division to have the shipment of troops conform as closely as possible to the "Priority of Shipments Schedule", but various things conspired to make this difficult. In March, 1918, Pershing cabled that altogether too many combat troops were reaching France in proportion to service-of-the-rear (service of supply, "S. O. S."), corps, and army troops.<sup>52</sup> But the chief difficulty was the shortage of ocean tonnage, especially cargo tonnage, for obviously it was inadvisable to ship troops to France unless we were prepared to maintain them there. The limited production of certain necessary supplies and the limited facilities for embarkation and especially debarkation still further complicated matters. In February, 1918, the situation looked so black that the Director of Operations believed it would be virtually impossible to transport the first three phases—819,000 men—to France by August 1, 1918; it might be practicable, he thought, to send over about 300,000 men in addition to the 275,000 men of the first phase which he anticipated would be in France by March 1. But as a basis for requirements and estimates on the part of the supply bureaus he suggested a "tentative strength table" calling for the presence in France of 837,000 men by June 1, 1,051,000 by August 1, and 1,372,000 by December 1. In other words, the hope of fulfilling General Pershing's plan for an army of five corps in France in time for an offensive in 1918 was postponed until 1919. On February 25, 1918, the plans and recommendations of the Director of Operations were approved by the Secretary of War.<sup>53</sup> This is really the first "official plan" for the raising and transportation of the army.

The success of the German offensive which began March 21 was so great that the War Department was led to attempt what five weeks earlier had been considered impossible. Ships were procured, men and supplies were provided, and the greatest troop movement in history began. The complete story of that achievement cannot be told here, for its success was dependent rather upon ship-

<sup>52</sup> Memorandum of Gen. Henry Jervey, director of operations, to the Adjutant General, Mar. 27, 1918.

<sup>53</sup> Memorandum of Gen. Henry Jervey to the Chief of Staff, Feb. 18, 1918.

ping than upon the railroads. But it must not be forgotten that every man shipped abroad had to be transported by rail to the port of embarkation before he could go aboard ship and that frequently detachments travelled farther by rail to reach the port of embarkation than they did by army transport to reach the port of debarkation in France or England. Between the first of May, 1917, and the eleventh of November, 1918, the Troop Movement Section of the railroads supervised the transportation to the various ports of embarkation of 2,174,455 men. Of these 1,758,033 or 81 per cent. of the total, were transported to Hoboken and the embarkation camps serving that port, 250,404 men, or about 12 per cent., to Newport News, and the rest to other ports.<sup>54</sup> Of the total number carried to the ports of embarkation during the nineteen months of the war 76 per cent. (1,653,470 men) were embarked for overseas in the seven months from April to November, 1918. The shipment of troops continued to follow the "Priority of Shipments Schedule" of October, 1917, but with the emphasis upon combat troops and at no time during the war did the number of auxiliary troops or "S. O. S." troops attain the proportions desired by General Pershing. So far as divisions were concerned the first three phases had been completed by the middle of June; by August 12 the combat troops, at least, of five phases were overseas, and the Operations Division was planning to send the sixth and seventh phases of combat troops. By November 11 these seven phases had been completed. July 18, 1918, it was decided to increase the American Expeditionary Forces abroad to at least eighty divisions (about 3,360,000 men) by June 30, 1919, and the succeeding drafts were all calculated upon that basis.<sup>55</sup> But the signing of the armistice November 11 halted the fulfillment of these ambitious plans. At that time there were approximately 3,757,624 men in the United States Army; of these some 2,086,000 had been transported overseas and 1,671,000 remained in the United States.<sup>56</sup>

The limitations of space forbid any detailed discussion of the movement of troops to the ports of embarkation. It must suffice to describe the method by which troops were despatched from camp to seaboard. In the first place the Operations Division of the General Staff drew up from time to time "priority lists" designating certain units for service overseas and giving the contemplated dates of

<sup>54</sup> *Annual Report of the Director General of Railroads* (1918), "Operations", p. 47.

<sup>55</sup> *Report of the Chief of Staff, U. S. A., to the Sec. of War* (1919), pp. 10 ff.

<sup>56</sup> *Annual Report of the Secretary of War* (1919), pp. 3 ff.

their movement from mobilization camps to ports. These programmes, made after conference between the embarkation officials, the Inland Traffic Service, the Troop Movement Section of the railroads, and the Operations Division, General Staff, usually covered shipments from camps to ports for a period of one month in advance. They directed the various departments to prepare the troops thus designated for overseas service, and when they were ready, to notify the Director of Embarkation at Washington. A copy of the list, subject to change, was forwarded to the port of embarkation, where it was turned over to the "dispatch office". That office then sent to each organization listed a letter of instructions and the embarkation and debarkation regulations. When a reply was received stating that the organization was fully equipped, or equipped except for certain shortages that could not be supplied, the Director of Embarkation was notified. He in turn informed the Adjutant General, who telegraphed the department or camp commander to forward the troops when their presence was desired at the port. As soon as space was available at the embarkation camps, or on transports, and provided the organization stood in the proper place on the priority schedule, it was ordered to port on the authority of the commanding general of the port of embarkation. The general agent of the Railroad Administration notified the Troop Movement Section at Washington of the movement and the latter then arranged the routing and train schedule to conform as closely as possible to the desires of the dispatch office. "The movements of the troops to the ports were so timed as to fit in with all other rail movements throughout the United States so as to avoid congestion and an excessive demand for equipment during a limited period."<sup>57</sup> The various authorities of the port who were interested in the movement were also informed and were thus enabled to make the necessary preparations for the reception of the organization upon its arrival. The general agent and the local quartermaster at the starting point were responsible for the assembling of equipment and the arranging of all the details of departure.<sup>58</sup>

Such was the process followed in the case of troops not in divisions. With divisions the procedure was somewhat different. When a division on the priority list was reported nearly ready to entrain for the port, the dispatch office telegraphed for the division liaison officer and at the same time ordered into the embarkation camp the

<sup>57</sup> *Rept. of the Chief of Staff, U. S. A., to the Sec. of War* (1919), p. 40.

<sup>58</sup> Report of Maj. S. J. Chamberlin, dispatch officer, to the commanding general at the port of embarkation, Hoboken, N. J., Aug. 29, 1918.

advance debarkation and billeting detachments and the advance school detachments, which usually preceded the division abroad.<sup>59</sup> Before the great troop movement began in April, 1918, an attempt was made to have the various elements of a division entrain in the order General Pershing desired them to arrive in France.<sup>60</sup> The first units to depart for the seaboard were generally the engineer regiment and field train, field signal battalion, and sanitary squadrons; then came the division headquarters, followed at a little interval by the headquarters train and military police, the remaining divisional trains, half the medical complement of field hospitals and ambulance companies, the bakery and butchery company, and base hospital. These were followed by the two infantry brigades, the machine-gun battalion and artillery brigade in the order named, and the remaining auxiliary units brought up the rear. The 32d Division, for example, observed this arrangement quite closely in its movement from Camp MacArthur, Waco, Texas, to Camp Merritt, New Jersey. The movement began January 10, 1918, and was not completed until February 13. To transport the 24,874 men in the division required fifty-eight trains, each averaging fifteen cars and carrying 428 men. The distance travelled averaged 1969 miles per train and was covered in five days and eight hours, at an average rate of 15.3 miles per hour.<sup>61</sup>

As general agents, camp quartermasters, entraining officers, and railroad officials became more experienced in the handling of troop-trains they constantly bettered their previous records. One or two examples of what they accomplished will not be out of place here. On June 19, 1918, the 91st Division began its movement from Camp Lewis, Washington, to Camp Merritt. Between that date and June 30, sixty-four trains were despatched eastward carrying the 27,085 men of the division. The last train arrived at its destination at 9:00 P.M., July 6. These sixty-four trains were sent over thirteen different routes, the average distance travelled by each train being 3205 miles. Running at about twenty miles per hour each train required an average time of six and a half days to make the journey across the continent. The average number of cars per train was thirteen; of men 423.<sup>62</sup> Perhaps the best performance of the war in the field of transportation was the movement of the 18,819 men of the 8th Division (less its artillery brigade) from Camp Fre-

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>60</sup> Memorandum of Lt.-Col. J. R. McAndrews, General Staff Corps, for the Chief of Staff, Dec. 7, 1917.

<sup>61</sup> Records of the Troop Movement Section, U. S. R. R. Adminis.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*

mont, California, to Camp Mills, Long Island, in October, 1918. The first train left camp at 9:00 A.M., October 18; the others at hour and a half intervals from 9:00 A.M. to 4:30 P.M., at the rate of six trains per day; the last train left at 4:30 P.M., October 24. These forty-two trains averaging 448 men and 13.8 cars to the train, traversed the 3444 miles to their destination at an average rate of speed of 20.2 miles per hour. The average time per train was seven days and three hours. The efficient co-operation of all concerned in the movement made possible the despatch of all the trains on the minute scheduled, with the exception of two, which were respectively four and five minutes late. As a result of a competition in loading inaugurated among the train commanders, few trains after the second day required more than five minutes from the time of arrival of the troops in the entraining area to the last man entrained. Fifteen trains were loaded in less than three and a half minutes each.<sup>63</sup> The utmost secrecy was maintained in the despatch of troop-trains to ports of embarkation and all telegraphic reports regarding their movements were transmitted in cipher. While railroad officials had been authorized as early as September 13, 1917, to notify accredited Red Cross representatives at points where troop-trains were scheduled to stop, on December 11 they were instructed not to impart this information in the case of trains moving toward a seaport.<sup>64</sup> This restriction remained in force until October 12, 1918, when it was removed by order of the Director of Operations.<sup>65</sup>

As regards equipment it was at first the policy of the War Department to send troops to the ports of embarkation completely equipped with both personal equipment and organization property. This was not always practicable, however; the artillery units almost without exception took no guns with them, and horses or mules, when taken, were usually sent to Newport News for shipment to France. In November, 1917, General Pershing was insistent that all divisions and other units sent to France should be completely equipped with the authorized transportation, at least, before leaving the United States.<sup>66</sup> The instructions to the ports of embarkation directed that all equipment so far as practicable be shipped on the same vessel with the organization to which it pertained,<sup>67</sup> but the

<sup>63</sup> Report of Capt. C. D. Gorton, entraining officer, 8th Div., to commanding general, 8th Div., Oct. 26, 1918.

<sup>64</sup> *Bulletins*, nos. 30, 30A, Sept. 13, Dec. 11, 1917, of ex. com. of Special Committee on Natl. Defense, Am. Railway Assn.

<sup>65</sup> Memorandum, Gen. Henry Jervey for the Adjutant General, Oct. 12, 1918.

<sup>66</sup> Pershing, cable no. 279, par. 5, Nov. 10, 1917.

<sup>67</sup> Director of Purchase, Storage, and Traffic to the Adjutant General, Apr. 19, 1918.

heavy troop movements in the summer of 1918 made this procedure difficult if not impossible. July 5, 1918, Pershing cabled that confusion existed due to the fact that organizations were still arriving without their equipment. He recommended that the organizations should be embarked with their equipment on the same transport; if that were impossible, organizations should be stripped of their organization property in the United States, the property turned into depots and subsequently shipped in bulk without reference to any particular organization: it would thus become available for general issue.<sup>68</sup> The second alternative was adopted August 10, 1918; troops were ordered to take with them overseas only individual equipment and clothing, field ranges and organization records.<sup>69</sup> Until July 11, 1918, each enlisted man was entitled to carry with him a barrack bag with extra equipment, the weight being limited to seventy-five pounds; after that date his clothing and equipment were reduced to that carried on the person. Officers' baggage also was reduced, company officers being allowed to take only 150 pounds instead of the 250 pounds previously authorized.<sup>70</sup>

From May, 1917, when the Troop Movement Section began its work, until November 11, 1918, the railroads of the country transported 8,714,582 men, an average of 502,764 per month. The maximum was reached in July, 1918, when no less than 1,147,013 men were moved. Between September 5, 1917, and the armistice 2,287,926 drafted men were entrained at 4531 separate points in larger or smaller units and moved on schedule to their stations, in many cases upward of a day's journey, and in all cases were fed in transit.<sup>71</sup> It would be difficult to overestimate the amount of detail involved in routing, scheduling, moving, and feeding these men. It required 11,959 special troop-trains, each averaging 875.4 miles, to transport 5,046,092 men, in addition to the drafted men referred to above and the 1,380,564 men carried on regular trains. This is undoubtedly the greatest long-distance troop movement by land in history. The railroads carried 2,174,455 men into the crowded port terminals for embarkation overseas without interfering with the heavy traffic already being handled through those ports and in the

<sup>68</sup> Pershing, cable no. 1419, July 5, 1918.

<sup>69</sup> *Circular*, War Dept., Aug. 10, 1918.

<sup>70</sup> *Id.*, July 11, 1918.

<sup>71</sup> The figures given here are those of the Troop Movement Section. *Second Rept. of the Provost Marshal General* (1918), p. 241, says that 2,755,476 drafted men were transported to camp by rail. It is quite possible that many men transported in regular trains were not reported to the Troop Movement Section, which concerned itself primarily with the movement of special trains.

adjacent territory. During one period of thirty days more than twenty troop-trains each day were brought into the port of New York. During the entire period of the war there were but sixteen train accidents involving death or injury; but thirty-nine men were killed and 335 injured. Of the total number of men moved during the war about 26.2 per cent. were drafted men on their way to camp; 24.9 per cent. were troops moving toward the ports and the remaining 48.9 per cent. represents the mobilization of the Regular Army and National Guard, and the intercamp movements.

To accomplish so vast an achievement required the use of approximately 70,413 sleeping-cars, 135,756 coaches, 16,285 baggage-and express-cars, and 23,075 freight-cars. The average number of men carried in each special troop-train was 421; the number of cars per train was 12.6 and an average rate of 19.8 miles per hour was maintained. Besides the 11,959 special troop-trains mentioned above it is estimated that 4576 special trains were required for drafted men. It was not found necessary, as in Europe, to utilize freight-cars for the transportation of troops; and in fact it was customary to furnish sleeping-cars in all journeys which extended over twenty-four hours. It was not always possible to do this, of course, but 2,671,074 men, about 30.6 per cent. of all troops moved, were handled in Pullman cars.<sup>72</sup>

The work of the railroads of the United States in transporting the soldiers of the American army to the camps, from camp to camp, and finally to the ports of embarkation for service overseas, was not spectacular, nor did it receive as much attention as it deserved from the people of the country, for much of it was necessarily veiled in secrecy and the newspapers said very little about it. But it was splendidly done, nevertheless, and it was by no means the least factor in the ultimate success of the United States in the war. That the War Department so regarded it is shown by the fact that in March, 1919, it conferred the Distinguished Service Medal upon Mr. George Hodges, manager of the Troop Movement Section, for meritorious services in connection with the movement of troops in the United States.

Ross H. McLEAN.

<sup>72</sup> *Annual Report of the Director General of Railroads* (1918), "Operations", pp. 46 ff.